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Abstract. 
This empirical study seeks to identify key determinants of the Presidential approval 
rating. Instrumental variables estimation reveals that, over the 1960-1997 study period,  
the Presidential approval rating was positively affected by the 1991 Gulf War (a 
“popular” war), a perceived genuine effort to reform the Internal Revenue Code 
(reflected by passage of  the Tax Reform Act of 1986), increases in the real (constant 
dollar) federal personal income tax exemption, and reductions in the average effective 
federal personal income tax rate. In addition, the Presidential approval rating was 
negatively impacted by the Vietnam War (an “unpopular”/controversial war), 
Presidential impeachment proceedings, and large federal budget deficits (relative to the 
size of the economy).    
 
Introduction   
 
In addition to receiving extensive attention in the various news media, the topic of 
Presidential approval ratings has received considerable attention in the scholarly literature 
as well [e.g., Mueller (1973), Monroe (1984), Brody (1991), Edwards (1991; 1998), 
Clarke and Stewart (1994), Campbell and Mann (1996), King (1999), Erikson, MacKuen, 
and Stimson (2000), Jones (2001), Cohen (2003), Abramowitz (2004), Canes-Wrone 
(2004), and Yaffee (2004)]. Various of these studies have expressly endeavored to link 
Presidential approval ratings to Presidential re-election prospects [e.g., Campbell and 
Mann (1996), Jones (2001), and Abramovitz (2004)].  This link between Presidential 
approval and election may well be highly significant; however, one must be cautious not 
to overestimate the capacity of the approval rating to dependably and consistently predict 
Presidential election outcomes. This is because the complexity of voting and the myriad 
ways in which the public expresses its views regarding candidates for public office, 
public officials, and public policies is really quite remarkable and diverse [e.g., Buchanan 
and Tullock (1962), Tiebout (1956), Tullock (1967; 1971), and Copeland and Laband 
(2002)]. 
  
The present study seeks to identify key determinants of the Presidential approval 
rating. If in fact Presidential approval ratings do significantly influence incumbent 
President/Administration re-election prospects, then a knowledge of which factors or 
types of factors systematically influence the Presidential approval rating could be 
invaluable to the formulation of political and economic policy across much of the 
political spectrum and to national political party platform formulation during Presidential 
election years. The explanatory variables in this analysis include both variables that are 
fundamentally economic in nature and variables that are fundamentally non-economic in 
nature. Hopefully, insights gained from this analysis will help to improve understanding 
of (a) the process by which the U.S. populace forms assessments of the President’s job 
performance and, albeit merely only indirectly, (b) prospects of re-election or the failure 
to be re-elected by an incumbent President/Administration.   
 
The Model 
 
The public’s approval rating of the President (APP) is hypothesized to be an 
increasing function of the public’s positive perceptions (POSPERC) of the 
President/Administration and a decreasing function of the public’s negative perceptions 
(NEGPERC) of the President/Administration:  
 
APP = f (POSPERC, NEGPERC), fPOSPERC > 0, fNEGPERC < 0   (1) 
 
            In general terms, positive public perceptions of the President are hypothesized to 
be an increasing function of the President’s (or Administration’s) perceived successes 
while in office, as well as the President’s (or Administration’s) perceived positive 
character traits while in office. Conversely, negative public perceptions of the President 
are hypothesized to be an increasing function of the President’s (or Administration’s) 
perceived failures while on office, as well as the President’s (or Administration’s) 
perceived negative character traits while in office. The public’s assessments falling 
within these two broad categories of perceptions can be further defined so as to provide 
measurable variables that can be investigated for their influence over the Presidential 
approval rating.   
 
To begin the analysis, this study follows Mueller’s (1973) and Schlesinger’s 
(2004) implicit lead by considering the potential influence of war on Presidential 
approval ratings. A President embarking on or conducting a “popular” war can be 
expected to experience higher approval ratings, ceteris paribus. Conversely, a President 
embarking on or conducting an unpopular or highly controversial war may very well 
expect to experience lower approval ratings, ceteris paribus [King (1999), Putnam 
(2000), Yaffee (2004)]. In this context, it is hypothesized in this study that the 1991 
Persian Gulf War (GULF), given its popularity among the U.S. public as an international 
joint effort (coalition) to free Kuwait of an invading military force from Iraq and given 
the implications of a successfully conducted military campaign for protecting crude oil 
availability and crude oil prices on the one hand and for stabilizing the Middle East 
politically and militarily on the other hand, provided the President a boost in his approval 
ratings. The 1991 Gulf War may have all the more boosted the President’s approval 
ratings because of how “easy” the victory was perceived to be; in point of fact, the 1991 
Persian Gulf War had been portrayed by the news media as potentially a militarily 
challenging endeavor, making the ease of victory that was actually experienced all the 
more impressive.  By contrast, the Vietnam War (VIETNAM) was arguably the most 
unpopular war of the second half of the (if not the entire) twentieth century for the U.S. 
Indeed, Putnam (2000, pp. 257, 146, 152) speaks of “…the trauma of Vietnam…,” the 
experiences of riots, widespread demonstrations, “…the clamor for Vietnam draft 
deferments…,” disruptions of national political nominating conventions, and the 
seemingly unending media coverage of the “carnage” that came to define and symbolize 
this war. Such experiences would seem to imply strongly that the Vietnam War was a 
highly controversial and generally unpopular war [King (1999), Putnam (2000)]. 
Consequently, Presidents embarking on and/or perceived as perpetuating this war would 
be expected to experience a diminished public approval rating. 
 The President is viewed as the principal leader of the U.S. government. 
Accordingly, it follows that to the extent that the populace is satisfied or pleased with the 
perceived overall operation/performance of its government and the perceived overall 
conduct of government officials, the President may be a benefactor in terms of his 
approval rating, i.e., a positive externality may be experienced. On the other hand, the 
more dissatisfied or displeased the populace is with the perceived overall 
operation/performance of its government and the perceived overall conduct of 
government officials, the more the President might experience a decline in his approval 
rating, i.e., a negative externality may be experienced. Thus, it is hypothesized in this 
study that the Presidential approval rating is a decreasing function of the public’s general 
disapproval (DIS) of government and the conduct of government officials, ceteris 
paribus.  
 
Alternatively, given that the President is perceived as the principal leader of the 
U.S. government, a course of action or behavior that embodies or projects either 
significant strength or weakness of character would likely influence the image of the 
President and hence the Presidential approval rating, ceteris paribus. One clear example 
of such an experience would be that of formal impeachment proceedings against the 
President (IMPEACH). Two sitting Presidents over the study period have in fact been 
impeached by the U.S. House of Representatives: Richard M. Nixon, for his involvement 
in the Watergate scandal, which Putnam (2000, p. 187) associates with an increased 
“…disillusionment with public life…” and a societal “…slump in civil engagement…;” 
and Bill Clinton, for his alleged/apparent perjury involving a civil suit and for his sexual 
misconduct in the White House while in office (and, de facto, his public dishonesty 
regarding same). Regarding the IMPEACH variable, Yaffee (2004, p. 1) observes that 
“The Watergate scandal is one of the greatest political scandals in American political 
history.” Indeed, Putnam (2000, p. 257) speaks of how Watergate became associated with 
a “…distrusting of institutions…” and a public sense of alienation from politics.  In any 
case, it is hypothesized in this study that the public’s approval rating of a President 
diminishes if he is in fact formally impeached [Putnam (2000), Yaffee (2004)], ceteris 
paribus. 
 
  Historically, economic issues have been subjects of debate both prior to and 
during Presidential primaries and during Presidential election campaigns. Arguably, 
economic factors that could plausibly play a role in the Presidential approval rating might 
include: (1) reduced average effective federal personal income tax rates per se; (2) 
increased real (constant dollar) personal federal income tax exemptions;  (3) reduced 
income tax rate progressivity; (4) perceived genuine efforts to reform the Internal 
Revenue Code; (5) unemployment rates; (6) employment growth; (7) real wage rate 
growth ; (8) inflation rates; and (9) large federal budget deficits. Indeed, most if not all of 
these specific factors have often been made key issues in actual Presidential campaigns. 
 Reducing the average effective federal personal income tax rate (AVETAX), 
reduces the average household’s federal personal income tax burden. Since the latter 
increases the personal disposable income for many segments of the taxpaying population 
(especially the “middle class”), it is expected that these taxpayers would tend to respond 
to this policy by raising their Presidential approval rating, ceteris paribus. Naturally, as a 
practical matter, for actual or would-be taxpayers with relatively very modest (or low) 
incomes, cutting the average effective federal personal income tax rate may yield only 
limited perceived direct benefits. On the other hand, households with very modest 
incomes are likely to perceive clear and direct tax benefits when the real (constant dollar) 
federal personal income tax exemption (EXEMPTION) is increased, especially since they 
on the average have more exemptions per household unit than higher income households. 
Indeed, for those households with the lowest income levels, increased real personal 
exemptions in many cases may even remove them from federal personal income taxation 
altogether (although they may still face Medicare and social security tax liabilities, 
depending upon circumstances). Hence, increased real federal personal income tax 
exemptions yield benefits to lower (and, although to a lesser degree, middle) income 
households, who in turn would likely express their “appreciation” with a higher 
Presidential approval rating, ceteris paribus. From yet another perspective, whenever the 
President and Congress act to cut the maximum marginal federal personal income tax rate 
(MAXTAX), it generally is the case that (1) the overall progessivity of the federal 
personal income tax rate structure is reduced, which in turn reduces disincentives to 
work, and (2) the disposable income of households across various income tax brackets is 
increased. Thus, when the maximum marginal federal personal income tax rate is 
reduced, it is hypothesized that the Presidential approval rating will increased, ceteris 
paribus. 
 
Next, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA) was portrayed by the media and by 
leading politicians alike as a genuine effort to reform the Internal Revenue Code. As 
documented in Ott and Vegari (2003, p. 275), among other things, the TRA reduced the 
number of tax brackets from 14 to three, increased the tax base by limiting tax 
deductions, reduced the marginal tax rates, and endeavored to “…improve fairness and 
efficiency…” in the Internal Revenue Code. The TRA also sharply reduced the tax 
benefits of limited partnerships, which was an effort to make the Internal Revenue Code 
more equitable as well, although it ultimately caused problems for the real estate industry 
[Sanger, Sirmans, and Turnbull (1990)] and the savings and loan industry [Barth (1991)]. 
To the extent that the public regarded the TRA as a genuine and effective initial effort at 
meaningfully reforming the Internal Revenue Code, it is hypothesized that the 
Presidential approval rating would be enhanced, ceteris paribus.  
 
Aside from tax-related issues, there may be other economic matters that influence 
the public’s approval rating of the President. Indeed, issues such as a high unemployment 
rate (UN) and a high inflation rate (P) are each likely, ceteris paribus, to reduce the 
public’s approval of the President because each of these experiences tends to reduce the 
public’s overall economic well-being and/or financial security. On the other hand, the 
greater the growth rate of real hourly wages (WAGEGR) and the greater the growth rate 
of aggregate employment (EMPLGR), the greater the public’s overall economic well- 
being. Therefore, ceteris paribus, as the value of each one of these factors increases, so 
too should the Presidential approval rating. And then there is the case of the federal 
budget deficit (DEF). Arguably, the greater the budget deficit, the greater the degree to 
which the federal budget may be viewed as (a) being managed in a fiscally irresponsible 
fashion and/or (b) posing potential long term economic problems [Krueger (2003)], 
including higher long term interest rates, reduced investment, and slower economic 
growth (as well perhaps as a reduced capacity to compete in international markets, which 
might lead to “outsourcing”). Accordingly, it is hypothesized that the higher the federal 
budget deficit per se, the lower may be the President’s approval rating, ceteris paribus. In 
the present analysis, the variables APP and DEF are specified as contemporaneous. The 
purpose of this temporal specification is to allow for the possibility that there may be 
somewhat of a contemporaneous link between these two variables because the 
President/Administration, in endeavoring to promote either a more rapidly expanding 
economy or to sustain growth in the economy, may often follow (overtly and/or covertly) 
a more or less on-going posture of supporting deficit-creating policies.  
 
 Based upon the framework developed above, the model of the Presidential 
approval rating is hypothesized to take the following form: 
 
APP = f(GULF, VIETNAM, DIS, IMPEACH, AVETAX, EXEMPTION, MAXTAX, 
TRA, UN, P,  WAGEGR, EMPLGR, DEF, ),  
fGULF > 0, fVIETNAM < 0, fDIS < 0, fIMPEACH < 0, fAVETAX < 0, fEXEMPTION>0, fMAXTAX <0, 
fTRA > 0, fUN<0,  fP < 0, fWAGEGR > 0, fEMPLGR > 0, fDEF < 0      (2) 
 
Empirical Analysis 
 
 Based on the framework provided in equation (2), the following model is to be 
estimated: 
 
APPt = a0 + a1 GULFt + a2 VIETNAMt + a3 DISt-1 + a4 IMPEACHt + a5 AVETAXt-1 
+ a6 EXEMPTIONt-1 + a7 TRAt + a8 MAXTAXt + a9 UNt-1 + a10 Pt-1+ a11 DEFt  
+ a12 WAGEGRt-1 + a13 EMPLGRt-1 +  u        (3)  
   
where:  
APPt = the average Presidential approval rating in year t; 
a0 = constant; 
GULFt = a binary (dummy) variable to indicate the year during which the 1991 Gulf War 
was materially conducted: GULFt=1 for 1991 and GULFt=0 otherwise;  
VIETNAMt = a binary variable to indicate the principal years during which the U.S. was 
significantly militarily involved in the Vietnam War: VIETNAMt = 1 for those years 
(1965-1973) and VIETNAMt = 0 otherwise; 
DISt-1 = a measure of the public’s dissatisfaction with government in year t-1;  
IMPEACHt= a binary variable to indicate the years during which a sitting President was 
impeached by the U.S. House of Representatives: IMPEACHt = 1 for 1974 and 1997 and 
IMPEACHt = 0 otherwise; 
AVETAXt-1 = the average effective federal personal income tax rate in year t-1, as a 
percentage; 
EXEMPTIONt-1 = the value of the federal personal income tax exemption in year t-1, 
expressed in 1996 dollars;  
TRAt = a binary variable to reflect the year in which the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was 
enacted;  
MAXTAXt= a binary variable indicating those years during which there was a reduction 
in the maximum marginal federal personal income tax rate; 
UNt-1 = the average percentage unemployment rate of the civilian labor force in year t-1; 
Pt-1 = the percentage inflation rate of the overall year-to-year consumer price index (CPI) 
over year t-1; 
DEFt = the ratio of the nominal total federal budget deficit in year t to the nominal GDP 
in year t, expressed as a percentage;  
WAGEGRt-1 = the average percentage growth rate of real wages in production over year 
t-1; 
EMPLGRt-1 = the percentage growth in aggregate employment over year t-1; 
u = stochastic error term. 
 
 Presidential approval ratings have been systematically gathered for several 
decades. The numerical range for the approval rating lies between 0.00 and 100.00. Over 
the 37 year study period, the average Presidential approval rating was 53.33, with a 
standard deviation of 10.62. The variable DISt-1 is constructed as an equally weighted 
average of three normalized indices reflecting answers to the University of Michigan’s 
Institute for Social Research (ISR) surveys. These three indices address whether 
government officials can be trusted to honor their obligations to the public, whether 
government officials are honest, and whether government officials waste tax dollars. 
Never included in the surveys were any questions regarding tax rates per se. Rather, the 
survey questions have tended to address whether tax revenues that had already been 
collected were in some sense perceived as being spent “wastefully,” inefficiently, or 
“improperly.” Values for the DISt-1 variable lie between –1.5, which corresponds to least 
dissatisfied, to +1.5, which corresponds to most dissatisfied. Thus, the greater the 
algebraic value of the index, the greater the public’s dissatisfaction with government.  
This series is available from 1960 through 1997. Therefore, the study covers the period 
1960-1997. The variable AVETAXt-1 is the average effective federal personal income tax 
rate, which Feige (1994) argues is the tax rate that best represents the burden of the 
federal personal income tax system for the average U.S. household. The federal budget 
deficit (DEF) is expressed as a percent of GDP because the deficit should be evaluated 
relative to the size of the economy [Hoelscher (1986), Holloway (1986), Ostrosky (1990 
 
 Since the variables APPt and DEFt are contemporaneous, the possibility of 
simultaneity bias arises. Accordingly, the estimation adopts an IV (Instrumental 
Variables) approach, with the instrument being the two-year lag of the percentage annual 
growth rate of real GDP (Yt-2). The choice of instrument was based on the finding that 
DEFt and Yt-2 were found to be highly correlated, whereas Yt-2 is uncorrelated with the 
error terms in the system. According to both the ADF (augmented Dickey-Fuller) and P-P 
(Phillips-Peron) unit root tests, over the 1960-1997 period, the variables APP, 
WAGEGR, and EXEMPTION are stationary in levels, but the variables DIS, AVETAX, 
UN, P, EMPLGR, and DEF are stationary only in first differences. Accordingly, the latter 
six variables are expressed in first differences form in the estimation. 
 
 Adopting the White (1980) correction, the IV estimate of equation (3) is given by 
the following: 
 
APPt = 43.6 + 13.5 GULFt – 11.55 VIETNAMt  + 4.24 qDISt-1   - 29.3 IMPEACHt 
        (+3.86)  (-3.26)        (+0.43)         (-2.95) 
 
 - 8.15 qAVETAXt-1  + 0.15 EXEMPTIONt-1  + 5.03 MAXTAXt-1 + 16.3 TRAt   
(-3.47)           (+2.67)                   (+1.52)               (+3.26)           
     
+ 36.9 qUNt-1 + 11.9 qPt-1 – 9.74 qDEFt  + 0.48 WAGEGRt-1 – 7.42 qEMPLGRt-1 
(+1.58)            (+1.83)       (-2.12)       (+0.30)                      (-0.03) 
 
F= 2.33, DW = 2.12, Rho = -0.06       (4) 
  
where terms in parentheses are t-values and q is the first-differences operator. 
 
 In estimate (4), nine of the 13 explanatory variables exhibit the expected signs, 
with seven of these being statistically significant at the five percent level or beyond. The 
estimated coefficients on the inflation, unemployment rate, wage growth, employment 
growth, dissatisfaction index, and maximum marginal federal personal income tax rate 
reduction variables all fail to be statistically significant at the five percent level. The DW 
and Rho statistics indicate the absence of serial correlation problems. Finally, the F-ratio, 
which is statistically significant at beyond the five percent level, attests to the overall 
strength of the model. 
 
 The estimated coefficient on the GULF variable is positive and statistically 
significant at the one percent level, implying that a war that is “popular,” i.e., strongly 
supported overall by the American populace, increases the Presidential approval rating. 
By contrast, the Vietnam War variable, VIETNAM, exhibits a negative coefficient that is 
statistically significant at the one percent level; thus, there is strong empirical evidence 
that a highly unpopular and controversial war acts to lower the Presidential approval 
rating. The estimated coefficient on the dissatisfaction index (DIS) is not statistically 
significant at even the ten percent level, implying that the public’s general dissatisfaction 
with the perceived overall performance of government and the perceived overall conduct 
of government officials does not significantly affect (yield negative net externalities on) 
the President’s approval rating. Not surprisingly, the coefficient on the IMPEACH 
variable is negative and significant at the one percent level, implying that the public’s 
regard for/approval of the President deteriorates when his behaviors have been so 
extreme or unacceptable as to result in a formal Congressional impeachment. The tax rate 
variable AVETAX is negative and statistically significant at beyond the one percent 
level, implying  strongly that when Congress and the President jointly act to reduce the 
average effective federal personal income tax rate, which action reduces the average 
household’s income tax burden and thereby increases disposable income for much of the 
taxpaying public, the public’s approval rating of the President increases. The estimated 
coefficient on the EXEMPTION variable is also positive and significant at the one 
percent level, implying strongly that increasing the real federal personal income tax 
exemption increases the public’s approval rating of the President, presumably at least in 
part because—especially at the lower end of the income spectrum—such a policy reduces 
federal income tax burdens. The coefficient on the TRA variable is positive and 
significant at the one percent level. Thus, it appears that the enactment of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 may have been perceived favorably by the general public as a genuine and 
effective effort at reforming the Internal Revenue Code. In point of fact, this statute did 
make a number of substantive changes in the Code [Ott and Vegari (2003), Sanger, 
Sirmans, and Turnbull (1990)]. The coefficients on the unemployment rate, employment 
growth, real wage growth, and inflation rate variables all fail to be statistically significant 
at the five percent level, implying that none systematically and consistently explains the 
Presidential approval rating. These four results seemingly raise the question: “Can the 
Presidential approval rating dependably predict the Presidential election outcome, given 
that inflation, employment (job) growth, real wage growth, and unemployment rates are 
issues generally thought to significantly influence Presidential election outcomes per 
se?” This is of course a question beyond the scope of the present study. Finally, the 
estimated coefficient on the deficit variable (DEF) is negative and statistically significant 
at beyond the five percent level. Thus, it appears that the larger the federal budget deficit 
(relative to the size of the economy), the lower the public’s approval rating of the 
President. Apparently, the American public experiences a degree of concern regarding 
larger federal budget deficits, arguably because of its perceived potential adverse effects 
on the economy over time and/or a perceived fiscal irresponsibility that larger budget 
deficits may imply.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Based on the IV estimation in this study, it appears that over the 1960-1997 study 
period, the Presidential approval rating was positively and significantly impacted by the 
1991 Gulf War (arguably, a surrogate for a “popular” war), increases in the real federal 
personal income tax exemption, reductions in average effective federal personal income 
tax rates, and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (arguably, a surrogate for an effort to enact 
genuine tax reform). In addition, the Presidential approval rating was negatively and 
significantly impacted by the Vietnam War (arguably, a surrogate for an 
unpopular/controversial war), Presidential impeachment proceedings, and larger federal 
budget deficits (relative to the size of the economy). These findings should prove relevant 
information for those interested in public perceptions of Presidential job performance and 
Presidential election forecasting. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Data Appendix/Sources 
 
http://www.geocities.com/americanpresidencynet/approval.html 
Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Report of the President, 2004, Tables B-1,  
B-2, B-37, B-42, B-47, B-64, B-78. 
Institute for Social Research (1960-1997), www.isr.umich.edu 
www.irs.gov 
www.infplease.com 
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